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In the 1990s, when I was an undergraduate student, in front of the main build-
ing of the University of Turin there was a big parking lot, which was always com-
pletely full. Two guys were looking after the parking lot every day from early in the
morning till very late in the afternoon. They were neither authorized, nor paid by the
town council, but they received tips from the students to optimize the space in the
parking lot and monitor their cars. The guys did not look very reliable, they wore
poor and dirty clothes and they were covered by self-made aggressive-looking tat-
toos. However, it was not unusual to see one of these guys sitting in a very expensive
sports car, smoking stinky cigarettes and listening to loud music from the car-stereo.
In fact, when the parking lot was completely full, students used to leave their car to
the guys who parked it as soon as a place was available. Imagine a first-year student,
who goes to the university by car for the first time, enters the parking-lot and finds
out that there is no place available to park her car. Then, one of the unauthorized
“attendants” offers her to take the car, park it as soon as a place is available, and
then leave the key on it. Judging from the appearance, the guy certainly does not
look trustworthy. However, it seems that many other students indeed trust him, since
there is a long queue of cars waiting to be parked, including some expensive ones.
Would the student leave her car to the attendant? Would she take the number of
other cars waiting to be parked as a signal that the attendant is trustworthy?
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This example represents a typical trust problem between two actors. By “trust
problem” I indicate a situation with a specific incentive structure which I will specify
later. Moreover, the trust problem described in this example occurs in an embedded
setting. I refer to this situation as “embedded” because it does not represent a simple
isolated encounter between two actors. On the contrary, in the example, the actors
may know each other (e.g., because the same interaction occurs every day), and they
may share relations to some third parties (e.g., the other students who left their cars
to the parking-lot attendants). Consequently, some information concerning the actor
to be trusted or the specific trust problem is available to the actor who has to decide
whether to trust.
2. Trust
In recent years, research programs on trust have been extremely numerous and
diverse in terms of both theoretical and methodological approaches, and empirical
applications. Moreover, research on trust has spread widely across disciplines [Bar-
rera 2005; Bijlsma and Costa 2005; Bijlsma and van de Bunt 2003; Bohnet and Huck
2004; Bolton et al. 2004; Burt 2005; Burt and Knez 1995; Buskens and Raub 2002; Das
and Teng 1998; Gulati 1995; Macy and Skvoretz 1998; Möllering 2005; Nooteboom
2002; Rus and Igli? 2005; Simpson and McGrimmon 2007; Snijders and Keren 2001;
van de Bunt et al. 2005; Wittek 2001; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994]. Overviews can
be found in Misztal [1996], Rousseau et al. [1998], and Buskens and Raub [2008]. In
this paper, I will focus on one research stream and advocate approaching the prob-
lem of trust from the point of view of the individual actors involved, in order to gain
a better comprehension of the process by means of which trust processes develop,
stabilize, and collapse.
The approach I advocate is generally indicated by the label Analytical Sociology
[Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Barbera 2004; Hedström 2005]. In the framework
of this approach, what qualifies a sociological explanation is a focus on collective
phenomena that result, often as unintended consequences, from the actions of the
individuals who are restricted by the constrains and opportunities imposed by the so-
cial system in which the collective phenomenon emerges [cf. Boudon 1986; Coleman
1990; Hedström 2005]. The structure of an analytical explanation implies that three
sets of assumptions need to be made explicit in order for a collective phenomenon
to be understood: 1) a (micro) theory of action, specifying the principles regulating
individual actions or decisions; 2) a macro-to-micro transition, defining how individ-
ual actions are restricted or influenced by the environment in which they are embed-
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ded; 3) a micro-to-macro transition, an aggregation rule that determines how a set of
individual actions combine to produce a collective outcome [Coleman 1990, ch. 1].
The combination of these three sets of assumptions identifies the Social Mechanisms
determining the emergence of the collective phenomenon [Hedström and Swedberg
1998; Barbera 2004; Hedström 2005].
In the remainder of the paper, I will begin by introducing the key ingredients
that are necessary to spell out the social mechanisms of trust. Then, I will summarize
the mechanisms operating in trust processes. Subsequently, I will briefly review the
empirical research on these mechanisms and finally I will conclude with a discussion
on the usefulness of this approach.
2.1. What is Trust?
In the literature on trust, a first distinction could be made between scholars
focusing on the function of trust for the social system and those that look at trust at
the individual level. Examples of the first type of approach are Parsons’ conception
of trust in the normative system as a source of social order [e.g. Parsons 1937] and
Luhmann’s argument that trust serves the purpose of reducing complexity which
characterizes modern societies [Luhmann 1988; see Misztal 1996, ch.3, on the differ-
ent functions of trust]. However, as I anticipated in the introduction, social mecha-
nisms cannot be understood unless one identifies the relevant units of analysis: the
individual actors and the social interactions in which they are involved [Hedström
2005]. As far as the study of trust is concerned, actors can be individuals or collec-
tives (e.g., corporates, local institutions, national states, etc.). A problem of trust is a
social interaction involving at least two actors: a trustor and a trustee [e.g., see Snijders
1996; Buskens 2002; Buskens and Raub 2002; Barrera 2005]. I will further clarify the
differences between these two roles and the properties of the social interaction in
which they are involved in the remainder of this section.
Among scholars who studied trust at the micro level, one can find, on the one
hand definitions of trust that focus on psychological and cognitive elements [e.g.,
Barber 1983; Lewis and Weigert 1985; Robinson 1996] and, on the other hand, def-
initions that stress strategic and calculative elements [e.g., Arrow 1974; Camerer and
Weigelt 1988; Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990; Williamson 1993]. All of these definitions
more or less uniformly identify an element of risk due to the fact that, as far as the trust
problem is concerned, the welfare of the trustor depends on the action of the trustee
[cf. Rousseau et al. 1998, 395]. However, insofar as they fail to take the incentives of
the actors involved into account, most definitions that treat trust as a psychological
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state apply also to situations that, in my view, are not trust problems. For example,
Robinson [1996, 576] defines trust as a person’s “expectations, assumptions, or be-
liefs about the likelihood that another’s future action will be beneficial, favorable,
or at least not detrimental to one’s interests.” Then, according to this definition, we
can say that, when we lie in a hospital bed, we trust the doctors that their actions
“will be beneficial, favorable, or at least not detrimental to our interests.” However,
if we are considering the doctors’ capability to make the right diagnosis and choose
appropriate treatments, we should rather say that we confide that their actions will
be beneficial, and not that we trust them, because – as stated by Snijders [1996, 10]
using a similar example – we rely on their competence, not on their preferences.
Conversely, if we are considering the possibility that doctors do not apply perfect
care-intensity to our problem, for example because they want to dedicate more of
their time to other cases, it is appropriate to say that we trust them, because the source
of our concern lies in their preferences.
In the literature on trust, another important distinction can be found be-
tween scholars who treat trust as explanans and others who treat it as explanan-
dum [Craswell 1993]. In the first case, trust is offered as an explanation for cer-
tain behavior, typically seemingly non-calculative behavior, such as cooperation in
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Trust is used as an explanans when it is invoked as
an alternative justification for the trustor’s risk-taking behavior, namely a justifica-
tion that excludes the possibility that such risk is in the trustor’s calculated inter-
est [e.g. Lewis and Weigert 1985]. Trust is typically conceived as an explanans
by scholars who study trust at the level of the system [e.g. Parsons 1937; Luh-
mann 1988]. Conversely, in the second case, the term trust indicates risk-taking
behavior in situations that are described as a subclass of risky situations, namely
those in which the risk to which the trustor exposes himself depends on the per-
formance of another actor [Coleman 1990, ch. 5]. However, when trust is seen
as an explanandum, the term trust is used only to describe the trustor’s risk-tak-
ing behavior, rather than to offer an explanation for it. The explanation of the
trustor’s trusting behavior requires that some theory is provided, which may very
well include a calculative explanation [e.g. Gambetta 1988; Coleman 1990]. In
Craswell’s [1993] terms, this paper deals with trust as an explanandum. Understand-
ing the social mechanisms of trust means explaining the trusting decision of the
trustor (explanandum) as a function of the information about the trustee and about
Sociologica, 2/2008
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the social interaction that is available to the trustor before her trusting choice is
made.1
Gambetta [1988, 217] defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective prob-
ability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will per-
form a particular action [an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental],
both before he can monitor such action, [...] and in a context in which it affects his
own action” (emphasis in the original). Although this definition still includes both
“trust in the intentions of others not to cheat us and in their knowledge and skill to
perform adequately over and above their intentions” [ibidem, 218], Gambetta adds
two important elements. First, he restricts trust to situations in which the action of
the trustor depends on such subjective probability, and second, he introduces time
asymmetry by specifying that such subjective probability is assessed before the action
of the trustee can be monitored. In other words, trust is conceptualized as a strate-
gic decision of the trustor based on the subjective probability that a certain event
– dependent on the will of the trustee – will occur, and not just as a psychological
state.
Although his definition is merely cognitive and trust as behavior is explicitly
excluded, Hardin adds another important element in his definition of trust: the trust-
worthiness of the trustee. If the trustor’s trust in the trustee depends on the trustor’s
assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness, then it is essential to understand trust-
worthiness in order to explain trust. Thus, a congruent definition of trust must take
the trustee’s incentive to be trustworthy into account. According to Hardin [2002,
4], trust is encapsulated interest: “I trust you because I think [... that] you have an in-
terest in attending to my interest because, typically, you want our relation to contin-
ue.” Then, Hardin explores a number of possible arguments supporting the trustee’s
trustworthiness. These arguments include internal motivations, such as dispositions,
moral rules and internalized norms, as well as external motivations, such as institu-
tional devices and commitments [cf. Raub 2004].
The major features of a trust problem are summarized by Coleman [1990, ch.
5], who identifies four essential characteristics:
-The trustor has the possibility to place some resources at the disposal of the
trustee who has the possibility to honor or abuse trust.
-The trustor prefers to place trust if the trustee honors trust, but regrets placing
trust if the trustee abuses it.
x
1 For reader friendliness, throughout this paper I will refer to the focal actor facing the trust
problem (the trustor) using female personal pronouns, and to her partner, the actor who is to be
trusted (the trustee), using male personal pronouns.
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-There is no binding agreement that protects the trustor from the possibility
that the trustee abuses trust.
-There is a time lag between the decision of the trustor and that of the trustee.
The first point stresses the dependency of the trustor’s welfare on the action
of the trustee. The second point specifies that a trust problem is characterized by
“mixed motives”, in the sense that the interests of the trustor and the trustee are
partly common and partly conflicting. Consequently, a trust problem implies the risk
that the action of the trustee harms the interests of the trustor. The third point em-
phasizes that this element of risk cannot be eliminated exogenously, and the fourth
point restricts the definition to situations with a sequential structure, excluding situ-
ations in which the decisions of the trustor and the trustee take place simultaneously.
It follows from this definition that the trustor’s trust in the trustee is the trustor’s
decision to place some resources at the disposal of the trustee when confronted with
a situation resembling the description above. According to Coleman this decision
depends on the trustor’s subjective probability that the trustee will honor trust and
on the possible gains and losses depending on the trustee’s decision. The subjective
probability that the trustee will honor trust represents the trustor’s assessment of
the trustee’s trustworthiness. Coleman discusses possible reasons for the trustee to
be trustworthy throughout the chapter. However, he does not model explicitly the
incentives of the trustee. Formal definitions of a trust problem incorporating also this
aspect can be found in game-theoretical models.
2.2. Models of a Trust Problem
Game Theory is a very powerful instrument to investigate micro processes and
social interactions between interdependent actors. More specifically, the “games”
constitute a taxonomy of stylized social interactions, while the “theory” consists of
a set of rules and tools generally used to describe or prescribe how actors should be-
have when playing the games under various assumptions concerning their rationality
and preferences [Camerer 2003]. The simplest game-theoretical models assume 1)
that actors are rational, in the sense that their preferences can be consistently rank-
ordered and 2) that actors are selfish, in the sense that they are not interested in
the payoffs obtained by the other [Fehr and Gintis 2007; Buskens and Raub 2008;
Gächter 2008]. In general the rationality assumptions include also the assumption
that actors are forward-looking. This means that their decisions are only guided by the
expectations concerning future benefits while they take information about the past
into account only as far as it helps computing expected benefits. Furthermore, many
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game-theoretical models also assume that actors possess all the relevant information
concerning own and other’s preferences and set of alternative actions in a given game
(i.e., common knowledge and perfect information). This set of assumptions consti-
tutes the decision theory. In any social interaction – modeled using a particular game
–, the combination of the (predicted) decisions of the actors involved constitutes the
solution of the game. The solution of a game is an equilibrium when, given the deci-
sion of all the other actors involved, no agent has an incentive to change her decision
[e.g., Gächter 2008].
Standard game-theoretical models are generally quite parsimonious and allow
for precise predictions for most games, but they do not describe the actual behavior
of real actors very well. They are the social sciences equivalent of the perfect gas
model in chemistry: they provide a useful analytical tool and a normative benchmark.2
In order to improve the fit between theoretical models and empirical observations,
various solutions have been proposed: some scholars have argued that the actors’ ra-
tionality is actually limited and they have explained the empirical anomalies in terms
of the actors’ failure to recognize the incentive structure of the game being played
[e.g. Binmore 1998]; Other scholars have opted for a modification of the second
assumption, and have proposed alternative models of actors with somewhat altruistic
preferences [e.g. Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000].
This set of alternative models and assumptions, inductively modified by looking at
the actual behavior of subjects in experiments, is commonly indicated as Behavioral
Game Theory [Camerer 2003]. In general, when studying social interactions, one
starts with the simpler models and then modifies the underlying assumptions step-
wise in order to improve their predictive capability. The Games used to study trust
problems are the Trust Game [Camerer and Weigelt 1988; Dasgupta 1988; Kreps
1990] and the Investment Game [Berg et al. 1995; Ortmann et al. 2000].
x
2 I owe this metaphor to David Willer (personal communication).
Barrera, The Social Mechanisms of Trust
8
FIG. 1. Trust Game (Ti > Ri > Pi > Si).
The Trust Game (Fig.1) begins with a move by the trustor who has a choice
between trusting and not trusting the trustee. If the trustor withholds trust, the game
ends. In this case, the trustor receives P1 and the trustee receives P2. If the trustor
chooses to place trust, the trustee has the possibility to honor or abuse trust. If the
trustee honors trust, he obtains
R2 > P2
and the trustor obtains
R1 > P1,
while if he abuses trust the trustee receives
T2 > R2
and the trustor is left with
S1 < P1.
This game can be seen as a one-sided version of the well-known Prisoner’s
Dilemma. For this reason, payoffs are indicated with the conventional letters used
in the literature on the Prisoner’s Dilemma: T for temptation, R for reward, P for
punishment, and S for sucker. Generally speaking, the trusting decision of the trustor
depends on her subjective probability that the trustee is trustworthy [Gambetta 1988;
Coleman, 1990, ch. 5]. The assessment of this probability is based on what the trustor
Sociologica, 2/2008
9
knows about the trustee’s preferences [Hardin 2002] and about the structure of the
strategic interaction. If the game is played only once (i.e., there is no common past
and no common future) between two isolated actors (i.e., there are not any third
parties involved in the social interaction), and payoffs equal utilities, on the basis of
the standard assumptions listed above, the trustor has no reason to expect the trustee
to be trustworthy.3 Then, it is predicted that the trustor should not place trust: if the
trustor placed trust, the trustee would in fact abuse it because
T2 > R2.
Consequently, the trustor – knowing the payoff structure – should withhold
trust because
P1 > S1.
“No trust” and “Abuse trust” are equilibrium choices (in Fig.1 this is represent-
ed by double lines). Therefore, the payoffs in equilibrium are P1 and P2. This outcome
is Pareto sub-optimal, because both actors would prefer the payoffs yielded in the
situation in which trust is placed and honored, R1 and R2.
FIG. 2. Investment Game.
x
3 Assuming that payoffs are utilities implies that any sort of moral, emotional, or psychological
concern – such as envy, guilt, regret, fairness, etc. – induced by the outcomes of the game, does not
alter the rank order of the payoffs or, in other terms, all possible moral, emotional, or psychological
concerns are already incorporated in the payoffs so that the preference order of the players is T > R >
P >S. For examples of theoretical models of Trust Games explicitly incorporating such psychological
aspects see Snijders [1996].
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The Investment Game (Fig.2) models a situation in which the trustor’s choice
whether to trust the trustee and the trustee’s choice whether to honor trust are not
dichotomous choices as in the Trust Game. The two players start with an initial
endowment, E1 and E2. The trustor has then the possibility to send all, some, or none
of her endowment to the trustee. The amount of money that she decides to send,
denoted M1, is then multiplied by a factor m (with m > 1). The trustee receives an
amount equal to m times the amount sent by the trustor. The parameter m can be
interpreted as the returns the trustee makes due to the investment of the trustor. Then
the trustee can decide to send back to the trustor all, some, or none of the money he
has received. The amount returned by the trustee – denoted K2, satisfying
0 ? K2 ? mM1
– is not multiplied. After players have chosen their actions, the game ends and
the payoffs are computed.4 The payoff earned by the trustor (V1) is:
V1 = E1 M1 + K2,
whereas the payoff earned by the trustee (V2) is:
V2 = E2 + mM1 K2.
The amount that the trustor is willing to send to the trustee indicates the extent
to which the trustor trusts the trustee. Therefore, I refer to the trustor’s choice M1 as
(degree of) trust. Conversely, the amount that the trustee is willing to return to the
trustor represents the extent to which the trustee is trustworthy. Therefore I refer to
the trustee’s choice K2 as (degree of) trustworthiness.5
As in the trust game, assuming a one-shot game in which payoffs equal utility,
the trustee maximizes his revenues by keeping everything the trustor has sent to him.
Thus, the trustee should choose
K2 = 0.
Consequently, knowing the structure of the game and anticipating the trustee’s
behavior, the trustor maximizes her revenues by choosing
M1 = 0, since
E1 M1 < E1 if M1 > 0.
Therefore, “Send nothing” and “Return nothing” are the equilibrium choices
(in Fig. 2 this is represented by double lines) and the payoffs in equilibrium are E1 and
x
4 In figure 2, the payoffs earned by the trustor and the trustee are displayed above each other,
next to the end nodes of the game.
5 In the economic literature, K2 is often labeled reciprocity [e.g. Berg et al. 1995; Ortmann et
al. 2000]. The term reciprocity is used because if the trustor chooses a small M1, the trustee might
choose a small K2 as well in order to punish the trustor for not trusting him. Thus a small K2 does
not necessarily mean that the trustee is not trustworthy. However, the term reciprocity implies some




E2. As in the Trust Game, this outcome is Pareto-suboptimal, because both actors
would prefer the payoffs yielded in the situation in which trust is placed and honored,
E1 M1 + K2
and





For the Investment Game, Pareto improvements are always possible if
M1 < E1.
The pie that the actors are dividing reaches its maximum when the trustor sends
everything
(M1 = E1).
Ego gains from trusting the trustee only if the trustee returns more than what
the trustor sent
(K2 > M1) ,
but, given
M1 = E1,
all possible K2 chosen by the trustee induce outcomes that are Pareto non-com-
parable.
These two games differ because in the Trust Game “trust” and “trustworthi-
ness” are represented by dichotomous choices – trust vs. no trust, honor trust vs.
abuse trust –, while the Investment Game exhibits some “continuity” both in the
choice of placing trust and in the choice of honoring or abusing trust. The (symmet-
ric) Trust Game presented above can be seen as a “special case” of the Investment
Game in which the trustor has to decide whether to send everything or nothing to
the trustee,
M1 = E1 or M1 = 0,
and the trustee – if the trustor chooses to send everything – can choose to keep
everything
(K2 = 0),
or split the amount received in such a way that both actors end the game earning
the same payoff
(K2 = ?mE1 + ?E2).6
x
6 Asymmetric situations in which the trustor and the trustee do not earn the same when trust is
placed and honored (R1?R2) can also be represented using the Trust Game (e.g., see Bohnet and Huck
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Both games represent social dilemmas characterized by a conflict between in-
dividual and collective rationality [Rapoport 1974]. The situation in which trust is
placed and honored is collectively rational because in such a situation both actors
obtain a better payoff in comparison with the situation in which trust is not placed.
Nevertheless, it is individually rational for the trustee to abuse trust if the trustor
places trust. Consequently, it is individually rational for the trustor to withhold trust.
Thus, if the actors are individually rational and expect their partner to be individually
rational, a social dilemma yields a collectively irrational outcome.
Thus, whatever game one uses to model the trust problem, standard Game
Theory predicts that the trustor does not place trust and, if she did, the trustee
would abuse trust. Does this imply that according to standard game theory trust
cannot emerge? No, it only implies that, according to standard game theory, trust
cannot emerge in situations in which all the assumptions specified above are met.
More specifically, it implies that trust cannot emerge in isolated encounters between
perfect stranger who meet only once and have a certain preference order for the
payoffs of the game. However, this is clearly a rather stylized situation. In real life,
most trust problems occur in embedded settings, rather than in isolated encounters,
the information the actors posses may be incomplete and/or asymmetric rather than
complete and symmetric, the actors may take their past into account rather than being
purely forward-looking, the actors’ preferences may be partly altruistic rather than
purely selfish.
3. Trust in Embedded Settings
3.1. Types of Embeddedness
Unlike economists and (social) psychologists, sociologists are primarily inter-
ested in collective phenomena, rather than in micro processes. Then, since standard
Game-theoretical models of trust do not describe very accurately the behavior of the
actors, the models should be improved by injecting more realism into the assump-
tions concerning the macro level of the explanation rather than into the assumptions
concerning the micro level. Recall that analytical explanations include three compo-
nents: 1) a set of rules regulating individual decisions (behavioral theory), 2) a set of
assumptions concerning how the social conditions impact on the individual decisions
(macro to micro transition), 3) a set of assumptions on how individual decisions ag-
x
[2004]). By contrast, asymmetric situations in which trust is placed and honored can occur in the
laboratory when subjects play the Investment Game (if M1 > 0; K2 > M1; E1 – M1 + K2 ? E2 + mM1 – K2).
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gregate (micro to macro transition). Therefore, when a simple model does not work,
one should start improving it by modifying assumptions concerning the second and
third component. By contrast, the behavioral theory can be kept simple, as much as
possible.
For the study of trust, this means changing the assumptions on social conditions
replacing social isolation with social embeddedness [Granovetter 1985; Raub 1997;
Raub and Weesie 2000], rather than (or before) starting directly to modify the as-
sumptions concerning the rationality or the preferences of the actors.
Two dimensions of embeddedness can be distinguished: first, the trustor and
the trustee can have repeated interactions with each other, and, second, the trustor
can have some relations with other actors. I refer to the first dimension as dyadic
embeddedness and to the second as network embeddedness [Raub 1997; Buskens
2002; Buskens and Raub 2002; 2008; Barrera 2005]. Dyadic embeddedness refers
to situations in which a relation between the trustor and the trustee pre-exists the
specific trust problem, or to situations in which the trustor and the trustee are likely to
be facing each other again after the specific trust problem will be solved. Conversely,
network embeddedness refers to situations in which there exists at least one third
party who is connected to the trustor by means of a relationship allowing him or her
to provide the trustor with information about the trustee, as well as to receive similar
information about the trustee from the trustor. In the next section I will illustrate
the most important social mechanisms affecting the emergence of trust in embedded
settings. First, I will discuss the mechanisms operating under conditions of dyadic
embeddedness and then under conditions of network embeddedness. Introducing
the various mechanisms, I will modify the baseline assumptions in a stepwise fashion.
While discussing the social mechanisms I will generally refer to the Trust Game as a
model of the social interaction. However, the mechanisms that I will discuss can be
applied to the Investment Game, likewise.
3.2. Dyadic Embeddedness and Social Mechanisms
3.2.1. Dyadic Control
Dyadic embeddedness implies that the interaction between trustor and trustee
is repeated rather than one-shot. An important distinction is whether the game is
repeated a finite or an indefinite number of times. I discuss the indefinitely repeated
case first and the finitely repeated case in the next paragraph. Repetition changes the
analysis of a game considerably, because if a game is repeated, the actors need to take
into account the consequences that their actions can have for the future stages of the
Barrera, The Social Mechanisms of Trust
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game. In a repeated game, the actors can make their action conditional on the behav-
ior of their partner (i.e., technically, they can use conditional strategies). For example,
a trustor may decide to place trust as long as the trustee honors it, but stop placing
trust, as soon as the trustee abuses it. Thus, the trustor can exercise control over the
trustee. Control implies that a trustor rewards trustworthiness in the present by plac-
ing trust in future games, and punishes abuse of trust in the present by withholding
trust in future games. It has been shown that if the actors attach enough importance
to future payoffs, the indefinitely repeated trust game has an equilibrium in which
trust is always placed and always honored [Kreps, 1990; see Buskens and Raub 2008
for a detailed summary]. This equilibrium is not unique, but it pareto-dominates all
other possible equilibria.7 Thus, if an encounter is repeated, a control mechanism
ensures that trust emerges. In terms of my introductory example, if the parking-lot
attendant knows that I will be leaving my car under his custody for years to come,
it is in his interest to take good care that my car is not stolen. Accordingly, since I
know that he knows this, I can trust him. Of course, in this example, the control
mechanism may not be sufficient to establish trust, because, assuming that he could
simply steal the car himself, the parking-lot attendant would be weighting the value
of my car today against a couple of Euros a day that I would give him as a tip until
I graduate. His payoff corresponding to the temptation to abuse trust is much larger
than the payoff for honoring trust.8 However, such a simple control mechanism could
be sufficient in situations where the temptation to abuse trust is not so high.
3.2.2. Dyadic Learning
While a mechanism of control can be sufficient to guarantee the emergence of
trust in indefinitely repeated Trust Games, the situation changes drastically if one
analyzes finitely repeated games. If a game is repeated a finite number of times but
information is assumed to be complete, the game can be analyzed as a one-shot game
because the argument of backward induction applies. Simply put, this means that, in
a finitely repeated Trust Game if both actors have complete information (concerning
preferences, alternative actions, outcomes, and duration of the game), the last stage of
the game is identical to a one-shot game. But, if they know that there will be no trust in
the last game, then the one but last game can likewise be analyzed as a one-shot game.
x
7 The proof of existence of multiple equilibria in indefinitely repeated games is known as the Folk
Theorem. A typical solution when multiple equilibria are present is to assume payoff dominance,
which implies that both actors prefer to coordinate on the pareto-optimal equilibrium.
8 It can be shown formally that if T – R is very high, “no trust” is likely to be the unique




Following this line of reasoning, the game unravels to the beginning and no trust
can be expected already from the first game. Once again, however, standard game
theoretical predictions do not describe the behavior of real agents very well. That
is, real agents do not apply backward induction when playing finitely repeated trust
games [e.g. Camerer and Weigelt 1988; Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2004]. However,
behavior in such games is explained using a modified model in which information is
assumed to be incomplete [Kreps and Wilson 1982; see Harsanyi 1967-1968 on the
theory of games with incomplete information].
In a game with incomplete information, a move of Nature takes place before
the players’ moves and it is unobserved by at least one player [Rasmusen 2001, 50].
Typically, in games with incomplete information, it is assumed that different “types”
of players exist. The move of nature consists in selecting which of the alternative
types of players enters the game. In a Trust Game with incomplete information, it is
assumed that there are two types of trustees, one of which has different alternative
actions or different preferences concerning the payoffs ranking. For example, next
to the standard trustee – who prefers T2 over R2 – there could be an alternative type
for which
T2 < R2
or a trustee with no opportunity to abuse trust at all (see Raub [2004] for a
model of a one-shot Trust Game with incomplete information). The trustor only
knows the probability of encountering each type of trustee, but at the beginning of
the game she does not know with what kind of trustee he is playing. This implies that
the trustor is no longer sure that the trustee will abuse trust if trust is placed.
Kreps and Wilson [1982] developed a model for the finitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with incomplete information [see Bower et al. 1997 and Buskens 2003 for
applications of similar models to a Trust Game]. Applying this model to a Trust
Game, the trustee knows that if he abuses trust, the trustor learns that she is matched
with a standard trustee – for which
T2 > R2
– and will stop placing trust in the next rounds. Conversely, the trustor keeps
placing trust as long as the trustee honors it because she remains uncertain whether
the trustee has an incentive to abuse trust at all. Thus, Kreps and Wilson’s [1982]
model predicts that, at the beginning of the finitely repeated game, trust is placed
and honored for a number of rounds. In this phase all trustees honor trust. The
ones without temptation honor trust because they cannot do otherwise, the standard
trustees because they need to maintain a good reputation in order not to lose invest-
ments in later rounds of the game. When the end of the game approaches, reputation
building becomes less important for the standard trustees, until they become indif-
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ferent between honoring and abusing trust. At this point, all players start to random-
ize between their alternative actions. The randomization continues until trust is not
placed or until it is abused and then no trust is placed until the end of the game. This
solution, called sequential equilibrium, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and holds
also if the probability of encountering a non-standard trustee is very low.
I discussed the Kreps and Wilson [1982] model in this section on dyadic learn-
ing because the model assumes incomplete information and the possibility for the
trustors to learn what type of trustee they are facing by observing the trustee’s behav-
ior in previous games. However, the standard game-theoretical rationality assump-
tions are still met in this model, i.e. actors are assumed to apply forward-looking
rationality. By contrast, “pure” learning models typically assume backward-looking
rationality [see Macy and Flache 1995 and Macy and Flache 2002 for applications
of learning models to social dilemmas]. That is, they assume that actors do not look
ahead and compute expected future payoffs, but they rather adjust their behavior
according to their past experiences. Different types of learning mechanisms can be
distinguished [see Camerer 2003, ch. 6, for an overview of such models]. The most
widely applied families of learning models are belief learning and reinforcement learn-
ing. Belief learning models assume that actors update their belief about the other
player’s type or about the other player’s expected behavior. Players then calculate
the expected payoffs based on their beliefs concerning the other player’s strategy and
subsequently choose the strategy with the highest expected payoff. Conversely, rein-
forcement learning models are based on the payoffs that actors received in previous
games: the higher the payoff obtained by a given decision, the more likely it is that
a player will make that same decision again.
In a nutshell, one can say that the mechanism of dyadic control depends on
the shadow the future [Axelrod 1984]: the length of the common future and the
importance the players attach to it. Conversely, the mechanism of dyadic learning is
based on the shadow of the past: the trustor is more likely to place trust if she has
a history of successful interactions with a trustee, because she has learned that this
trustee is reliable.
3.3. Network Embeddedness and Social Mechanisms
3.3.1. Network Control
Moving from dyadic to network embeddedness changes the scenario quite dras-
tically: trustors can punish abuses of trust either by searching for another trustee or
by informing other trustors about the behavior of the trustee. In Hirschman’s [1970]
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terminology, the former strategy corresponds to exit and the latter to voice. The avail-
ability of these options provides the trustors with a means to control the behavior
of the trustees. The feasibility of the exit option depends on the availability of alter-
native partners and on the magnitude of sunk costs (i.e., relation-specific costs al-
ready incurred by the trustor). Modeling exit and voice simultaneously would require
rather complex models. Moreover, in some situations, like the parking-lot example,
the actors can only use voice because no alternative trustee is available. Therefore,
I concentrate my discussion on models of voice [examples of models including exit
can be found in Lahno 1995 and Weesie 1996].
As I anticipated in the beginning of section 3, my discussion proceeds stepwise:
I began with standard game-theoretical assumptions and isolated one-shot games,
and then I discussed repeated interactions without modifying the behavioral theory.
In models with network embeddedness, the interaction is likewise repeated and one
trustee interacts with more trustors [Buskens and Weesie 2000; see also Buskens,
2002, ch. 3] developed such a model for an indefinitely repeated Trust Game with a
network of trustors. These models are variants of the reputation model proposed by
Raub and Weesie (1990). As in the case of dyadic control, in this model the trustors
use conditional strategies. However, the trustors’ decision to place trust does not
depend only on whether the trustee has previously abused trust with her, but also
on whether the trustee has previously abused trust with other trustors. The model
assumes in fact that the trustors are embedded in a network of relationships through
which they can exchange information about the behavior of the trustee. This game-
theoretical model predicts control effects via network embeddedness. The solution
of the model implies that a given trustor places trust if the gain that the trustee would
obtain by abusing trust is compensated by the losses he incurs due to the sanctions he
will receive from the other trustors. In other words, placing trust is more likely if the
sanction potential of a trustor is higher. The sanction potential depends on the extent
to which that trustor transmits information to the network. Therefore, this model
leads to testable hypotheses concerning the effects of properties of the network on
the probability that a given actor places trust. For example, the probability that trust
is placed increases with the density of the communication network in which the actor
is embedded, and with the actor’s outdegree in the same network.9
x
9 In social network terminology, the outdegree of an actor is equal to the sum of her outgoing
relationships. If the network considered is one of information transmission, the outdegree of an
individual corresponds to the number of other actors to whom this individual transmits information.
Conversely, density is a global property of the network and it corresponds to the extent to which all
potential relationships in a given network are actually present or absent.
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In another study, Buskens [2003] applied Kreps and Wilson’s [1982] finitely re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma model to a finitely repeated Trust Game. Buskens [2003]
extended the original model by including an “exit” and a “voice” option for Ego. In
the voice model, two trustors can inform each other about the trustee’s behavior in
previous interactions. This model assumes incomplete information just as in Kreps
and Wilson [1982] and predicts that the trustor’s decision to place trust increases
with the frequency at which the two trustors can inform each other. Assuming that
trustors have incomplete information – that is, there are two types of trustees, selfish
ones and nice ones, the nice ones have no incentive to abuse trust – and that any
abuse of trust is type-revealing, Buskens [2003] showed that the trustor’s possibility
to inform each other about the trustee’s behavior makes the trustee more trustworthy
than if the trustors played with a given trustee individually. Thus, while nice trustees
do not abuse trust anyway, selfish ones mimic the behavior of nice trustees for longer
than if they were only playing with one trustor, in order to keep a positive reputation.
In terms of the parking-lot example, these models imply that a student can more
safely trust the parking-lot attendant the more she is embedded in social relationships
with other students, i.e., the higher her sanction potential through voice. This con-
clusion applies under the assumption that the parking-lot assistant knows that the
student is well embedded and thus can anticipate the he will receive high sanctions
if he abuses trust. Although one can hardly argue that the rationality assumptions
implied by these models are actually met, they present considerable improvements,
in terms of empirical realism, compared with models of the one-shot situation. In
fact, the solutions of these models permit that trust is placed and honored in equilib-
rium, even though the models still assume that the actors handle their decisions with
standard game-theoretical rationality.
3.3.2. Network Learning
As I stated earlier, the trustor’s decision to place trust in a given trust problem
depends on her assessment of the probability that the trustee will honor trust [Hardin
2002]. In game-theoretical models this idea translates in the assumptions about the
information that is available to the trustor before she makes her decision. Simple
standard models of one-shot games do not leave any room for learning because the
information is usually assumed to be complete. Conversely, learning is possible in
models with incomplete information. If the interaction is repeated, the trustors can
learn from own experience. If the trustors have relationships to other trustors with
whom they exchange information about previous interactions, they can also learn
from experiences made by others. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that such sec-
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ond-hand information is less valuable than own experience, but it is certainly plausi-
ble that actors learn how to behave in certain circumstances by observing what others
did and what payoffs did they obtain. The models typically used to study this mech-
anism are models of diffusion processes, e.g., diffusion of innovations [Valente 1995]
and disease epidemics [Altmann 1993].
An application of this kind of model to the study of trust can be found in
Buskens [2002, ch. 4]. Unlike the control models previously discussed, this model
does not include any strategic decision. Instead, Buskens modeled the transmission
of information focusing on the complexity of the social network through which the
information travels. The model allows prediction about the speed at which a given
actor receives a piece of information. Then, if one assumes that this information
concerns the behavior of the trustee in previous transactions with other trustors,
the model effectively predicts how fast a trustor learns as a function of the network
structure in which she is embedded. Of course, the effects of the information received
by a trustor on her trusting behavior depend only on the content of the information:
positive information leads to more trust; negative information leads to less trust. The
hypotheses – on the effects of network properties on trust – based on this model,
mirror the hypotheses based on the control model. For example, trustors with a
higher indegree are expected to be more likely to place trust (if the information about
the trustee is positive) because they receive information faster.10 One drawback of
pure learning models is that since in these models trustors apply backward-looking
rationality, the incentives of the trustee are not taken into account (a discussion of
the link between learning and control models can be found in Buskens [2002, 102]).
Conversely, learning models allow a more complex modeling of the network structure
in which the actors are embedded.
For the parking-lot example, such a learning model implies that the student will
be more likely to trust the attendant if she knows many other students who told her
that they left their cars to the attendant and nothing bad ever happened to it.
3.3.3. Imitation
Most learning models include two important assumptions: 1) transmitting in-
formation is not costly and 2) the information that the actors receive is reliable. The
costs of transmitting information need to be assumed away because otherwise the
transmission of information would correspond to the production of a public good,
x
10 In social network terminology, the indegree of an actor is equal to the sum of her incoming
relationships. If the network considered is one of information transmission, the indegree of an indi-
vidual corresponds to the number of other actors that transmit information to her.
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implying a free-rider problem.11 The second assumption implies that the potential
incentives to disclose false information are neglected. How problematic are these two
assumptions? They are certainly not problematic in those situations in which the be-
haviors of the trustor and the trustee are public or easily observable. For example,
the reputation systems used by many online platforms make the reputation score of
each seller easily available to all buyers (and possibly vice versa), the incentives to
provide false information and the costs of providing the feedback are negligible.
However, in many instances, only the information about the behavior of other
trustors is readily available, while the trustee’s responses in those interactions are
virtually impossible to obtain. When choosing where to have dinner in an unfamiliar
city, one can easily observe which restaurant has more customers. However, one will
never know how many of those customers are going to have a stomach ache the
day after. It seems inappropriate to argue that trustors can actually learn about the
trustworthiness of the trustees from such incomplete information. Nevertheless, it is
perfectly plausible that this information on the behavior of other trustors leads to
imitation, in the sense that an individual places trust in a trustee who is trusted by
many others. Imitation is usually considered a form of learning that plays an important
role in socialization processes [for example, Bandura and Walters 1963, ch. 2]. In
interactions resembling social dilemmas, imitation could be viewed as a parsimonious
way to achieve the optimal decision [cf. Hedström 1998 on “rational imitation”],
especially in settings where information is scarce.
Barrera and Buskens [2007] proposed a distinction between learning and imi-
tation bearing on the completeness of the information available. They adopt the term
“imitation” to indicate situations in which available information does not include the
outcomes obtained by others (e.g., other trustors facing a similar dilemma), but only
their behavior. Conversely, they use the label “learning” for decisions based on “full”
information that includes the outcomes obtained by others. Some imitation models
have been proposed by economists [for example, Pingle 1995; Pingle and Day 1996;
Schlag 1998], but they are actually variants of what Camerer [2003] would call “rein-
forcement learning” models because, in these models, actors make their decisions af-
ter receiving some information about the actions chosen by others and the outcomes
obtained by them. To my knowledge, no formal model of imitation, adopting the re-
x
11 A public good is a collective good that requires individual contributions to be produced. How-
ever, the individuals who do not contribute to its creation cannot be excluded from its consumption.
The production of a public good is typically modeled as an interaction resembling a prisoner’s dilem-
ma with more than two players, where for every player not contributing to the public good (i.e., free
riding) is a dominant strategy. A general introduction to this literature can be found in Fehr and
Gintis (2007), and Gächter (2008).
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strictive definition of imitation proposed by Barrera and Buskens [2007], is available.
However, such a model would be useful not only for the study of trust in embedded
settings, but also for other social phenomena, for example conformist behavior. The
advantage of such an imitation model is that the underlying behavioral theory is quite
simple and the model would not be very demanding in terms of cognitive abilities
of the actors.
When the student in my example drives into the parking-lot of the university,
she may decide to trust the attendant just because she can easily see that many other
students left their cars to the attendant. In spite of its plausibility, however, this
imitation mechanism can have perverse effects, since the student is not likely to find
out the day after whether any of those cars was stolen or damaged. An example
of an imitation mechanism leading to dramatically perverse effect can be found in
Franzinelli’s book about betrayal in Italy under the fascist regime. In 1938, after the
Italian government enacted the “leggi razziali” (racial laws), Italian Jews started to
be discriminated and – later – deported. Franzinelli [2001, 178-179] describes that
many Jews tried to flee from the country. Consequently, smugglers started to organize
their escape. Some smugglers were indeed trying to help the Jews, but others aimed
at taking possession of their property and handed the Jews over to the Germans.
Given the high risk of staying in Italy, many Jews had to trust the smugglers in order
to be guided to the Swiss border. Often, these Jews obtained information about the
smugglers through informal networks, such as relatives or friends of other Jews who
had already left, but they could hardly obtain reliable information on whether these
other Jews got across the border safely. In particular, they did not know how many
of them were ultimately handed over to the Nazis.
4. Empirical Research on the Social Mechanisms of Trust
In the last two decades, empirical research on trust in embedded settings has
been abundant [see Buskens and Raub 2008 for a detailed review]. Moreover, various
research methods have been applied, including surveys [e.g. Gulati 1995], laboratory
experiments [e.g. Bolton et al. 2004], factorial surveys [e.g. Rooks et al. 2000], and
combinations of complementary methods [e.g. Simpson and McGrimmon 2008].
Different research methods have different assets and liabilities. Laboratory experi-
ments are, by definition, more efficient at capturing actual behaviour as they allow
observation of the actors’ decisions in perfectly controlled environment [see Willer
and Walker 2007, ch. 1, on the role of experimentation in sociology]. By contrast,
surveys maximize the possibility to capture the initial conditions in which the actions
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take place but provide information only on personal attitudes rather than on behav-
iour. Since this paper focuses on the Social Mechanisms of trust, in this section I will
concentrate my discussion only on laboratory experiments on embedded trust, be-
cause in general, in surveys and factorial surveys, the actual mechanism is explicitly
or implicitly assumed rather than empirically observed.
4.1. Dyadic Embeddedness
Experiments studying dyadic embeddedness typically apply finitely or indefi-
nitely repeated games.12 Camerer and Weigelt [1988], Neral and Ochs [1992], An-
derhub et al. [2002], and Brandt and Figueras [2003] ran experiments using a finitely
repeated trust game. Effects of dyadic control based on Kreps and Wilson [1982]
model with incomplete information were found consistently in all these experiments:
trust is generally placed and honored in the first rounds of the repeated game, then
both trust and trustworthiness collapse when the last rounds approach. Effects of
dyadic learning are generally supported, too: actors do not place trust when it has been
abused in the previous round. These experiments reproduce the model’s predictions
pretty well although there are some deviations [see Camerer 2003, 446-453, for a de-
tailed discussion of these experiments]. Similar results were found also by Gautschi
[2000] who used a shorter series of repeated Trust Games and by Kollock [1994]
who likewise ran shorter series but using a different experimental design, where the
interaction was framed as a transaction between a buyer and a seller. The indefinitely
repeated Trust Game was studied by Engle-Warnick and Slonim [2004] who found
that trust decreases over time, although in theory this should not happen if players do
not know when the end of the repeated interaction is coming. One explanation for
this anomalous result might be that as the game proceeds the players believe that the
probability that it will end increases, even though they are informed that it does not.13
Finally, Barrera [2007] found an effect of dyadic learning in a one-shot Investment
Game, comparing pairs with and without a common past, where the common past
was created by letting the actors play a bargaining game before the Investment Game.
However, this effect of learning was significant only for trustors and not for trustees.
x
12 The literature on one-shot games is extremely vast, but I do not discuss these experiments here.
An overview of these studies can be found in Camerer 2003, 83-100.
13 This misconception is equivalent to the popular belief that “late” numbers – numbers who
have not been extracted for longer time at the Italian Lotto – are more likely to be extracted,





Investigating the effects of network embeddedness on trust using experiments
is a rather complex enterprise, because implementing personal relationships in the
laboratory is virtually impossible. Accordingly, the few studies who investigated this
problem manipulated social networks in terms of information transmission: the re-
searchers introduced the network by letting the computer program used in the ex-
periments transmit the information among the players. For example, in a network of
trustors, every trustor can see on her screen what choices were made by the other
trustors with whom she shares a network tie.
Bolton et al. [2004] ran a study with three treatments, which they call, stranger,
partner, and reputation. In the stranger treatment, the participants played series of
one-shot Trust Games, and where matched with a different player in every round. In
the partner treatment, the participants played a finitely repeated Trust Game, always
with the same partner. In the reputation treatment, the participants played series of
one-shot Trust Games, like in the stranger treatment, but every player received infor-
mation on the choices made by all other players in previous rounds. Thus, the reputa-
tion treatment is equivalent to a fully connected network of information transmission.
Bolton et al. [2004] found that both trust and trustworthiness collapse rather soon in
the stranger treatment. The partner treatment displays the typical results of finitely
repeated Trust Games, with high trust and trustworthiness in the first rounds, fol-
lowed by no trust or abuse of trust towards the last rounds. Finally, in the reputation
treatment, trust starts slower, but builds up as the game proceeds until it stabilizes at
a somewhat lower level than in the partner treatment. This indicates that the players
realize that they have more to gain if they keep placing and honoring trust. Bohnet
and Huck [2004] used a similar experimental design and obtained similar results.
However, although these studies clearly show that network embeddedness pro-
motes trust, the mechanism responsible for the positive effect is not pinpointed. On
the one hand, trustees may honor trust because they care about their reputation and
trustors may anticipate on this and place trust accordingly. On the other hand, the
trustors may learn from the reputation score of their partner to what extent he is
trustworthy and place trust accordingly. In other words, these results are consistent
with both learning and control. An experiment in which all mechanisms were put
simultaneously to a test was run by Barrera and Buskens [2009]. In their study, Bar-
rera and Buskens let groups of six subjects – four trustors and two trustees – play a
finitely repeated Investment Game in which the trustors received information about
the behavior of the other players. Furthermore, they manipulated the information
transmitted along these small networks so that some trustors received information on
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the behavior of both another trustor and her partner, while other trustors received
information only on the behavior of another trustor, but not on the behavior of the
trustee interacting with this trustor. This experimental manipulation permitted to
test simultaneously all mechanisms as well as to disentangle effects of learning and
imitation.
Next to dyadic learning and dyadic control, Barrera and Buskens found empir-
ical evidence for network learning and imitation, but no evidence for network con-
trol. Furthermore, surprisingly, the effect of imitation was stronger than the effect
of learning. Interpreting these results, it seems that as soon as the complexity of the
interaction and the amount of information that the players need to process increase,
the actors begin to adopt cognitively simpler heuristics. Thus, the effect of learning
is stronger at the beginning and becomes weaker in later series of games while the
effect of imitation shows the opposite pattern.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I summarized the literature on the social mechanisms of trust.
In the first part of the paper I discussed the link between the analytical approach
to trust and a number of prominent definitions of trust found in the literature [e.g.,
Coleman 1990, ch. 5; Gambetta 1988; Hardin 2002]. Subsequently, I reviewed some
actor-based theoretical models of trust in embedded settings which lead to identify
two main social mechanisms, learning and control [Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994;
Buskens 2002; Buskens and Raub 2002]. In addition, I discussed a third mechanism,
imitation [Barrera 2005; Barrera and Buskens 2007], for which some empirical evi-
dence is available [Barrera and Buskens 2008], but no formal model have yet been
developed. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I briefly summarized the experimen-
tal research on these social mechanisms.
In my view, there are at least three advantages resulting from the analytical ap-
proach to the study of trust. First, the analytical approach is intrinsically actor-based.
Therefore, it is best suitable for designing policies which ideally should likewise be
actor-based. Since the importance of trust as a “lubricant for cooperation” [Arrow
1974] is widely recognized, understanding which mechanisms drive the development
of trust is crucially important for organizations as well as for the society at large, be-
cause both have a strong interest in promoting cooperation between their members.
In general policies are more likely to be effective if they target the individual actors
and operate on the right leverages.
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Second, understanding social mechanisms implies opening the black box of
causal processes affecting social phenomena. Such causal processes cannot be appre-
ciated if social research is conducted mainly at the aggregated level; because different
configurations of actors and interactions can potentially lead to superficially similar
collective outcomes [see Hedström 2005 on this point].
Third, the social mechanism approach emphasizes the importance of the mi-
cro level, by requiring that the behavioral theory is made explicit in order to give a
complete (causal) account of a social phenomenon. The identification of the main
assumptions for a general behavioral theory is very important for the process of unifi-
cation of the discipline around a common paradigm [cf. Boudon 2002]. In this paper,
I make a contribution to this point by discussing the social mechanisms of trust in a
stepwise fashion, underlining the key assumptions that distinguish the mechanisms
from each other.
Finally, I want to sketch some possible direction for future research on the so-
cial mechanisms of trust. First, the three mechanisms analyzed in the paper focus
primarily on the role of the trustor in trust problems. In general, the mechanism of
control simply assumes that trustees anticipate on the decision of the trustors and be-
have accordingly, while learning and imitation are usually coupled with the assump-
tion of incomplete information (i.e., the existence of different “types” of trustees:
trustworthy and untrustworthy ones). However, since the trustor’s decision to place
trust is generally assumed to depend on her assessment of the trustee’s trustworthi-
ness [Gambetta 1988; Coleman 1990, ch. 5], it seems particularly important to un-
derstand what mechanisms drive the actions of the trustees. Nevertheless, research
on the determinants of the behavior of the trustees is still rather scarse [e.g., Buskens,
Raub, and van der Veer 2008 and Barrera 2007].
Second, although evidence of imitation was found in some empirical studies
[Barrera and Buskens 2007; 2009], from a theoretical point of view imitation has been
taken as a simple heuristic rather than explicitly modeled. Furthermore, although
imitation is certainly very common, a systematic investigation of the social conditions
under which imitation is more likely to occur is still lacking.
Third, although the importance of social networks for trust problems and for
the solution of cooperation problems in general is now widely recognized, all the
literature discussed in this paper treats social networks as exogenous. If the advan-
tages of network embeddedness are perceived also by the actors themselves, then
we should expect that the actors actively invest in the creation of social networks
[Coleman 1990, ch. 12; Flap 2004; Buskens and van de Rijt 2008]. In fact, research
on interactions in embedded settings in which networks are endogenized is rather
recent, but growing quite rapidly [e.g. Goyal 2007].
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The Social Mechanisms of Trust
Abstract: In the last decades, problems of trust and cooperation in general have received
much attention from scholars working in various scientific disciplines. In particular, research
in the field of analytical sociology has focused on the emergence of trust in embedded
settings investigating the individual decisions of the actors involved. These studies have
lead to the identification of three social mechanisms affecting trust in embedded settings:
Control, learning, and imitation. In this paper, I review the main theoretical models underlying
these mechanisms, discuss the link between these models and a number of prominent
definitions of trust found in the literature, and review the experimental research on these
mechanisms.
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